Abstract. In this paper, we study the security margins of hash functions BLAKE and BLAKE2 against the boomerang attack. We launch boomerang attacks on all four members of BLAKE and BLAKE2, and compare their complexities. We propose 8.5-round boomerang attacks on both BLAKE-512 and BLAKE2b with complexities 2 464 and 2 474 respectively. We also propose 8-round attacks on BLAKE-256 with complexity 2 198 and 7.5-round attacks on BLAKE2s with complexity 2 184 . We verify the correctness of our analysis by giving practical 6.5-round Type I boomerang quartets for each member of BLAKE and BLAKE2. According to our analysis, some tweaks introduced by BLAKE2 have increased its resistance against boomerang attacks to a certain extent. But on the whole, BLAKE still has higher a secure margin than BLAKE2.
Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions (simply referred as hash functions) are playing a significant role in the modern cryptology. They are indispensable in achieving secure systems such as digital signatures, message authentication codes and so on. In the cryptanalysis of hash functions, one of the greatest breakthrough was made by Wang et al. in 2005 when they successfully launched collision attacks on widely used hash functions MD5 [1] and SHA-1 [2] . After that, the analytic methods against hash functions have been greatly improved which threatens the security of existing hash functions. To cope with this situation, NIST proposed the transition from SHA-1 to SHA-2. Furthermore, NIST also launched the SHA-3 competition to develop a new hash standard. After years' analysis, five proposals entered the final round of SHA-3 and the one named Keccak became the new SHA-3 standard in 2012 [3] .
The BLAKE hash function [4] was one of the five finalists of the SHA-3 competition [5] . Although it was not selected as the SHA-3 standard, along with the other finalists, BLAKE is assumed to be a very strong hash function with high security margin and very good performance in software.
BLAKE2 [6] is a new family of hash functions based on BLAKE. According to [6] , the main objective of BLAKE2 is to provide a number of parameters for use in applications without the need of additional constructions and modes, and also to speed-up even further the hash function to a level of compression rate close to MD5.
Ever since its proposal, BLAKE has attracted a considerable amount of cryptanalysis, such as impossible differential attack [7] , differential attack [8] , collision, preimage [9] etc. There is also a boomerang distinguisher on BLAKE-32 given by Biryukov et al. in [10] but some incompatible problems were pointed out by Leurent in [11] . Despite of the incompatibilities, [10] indicates that the boomerang method may have good efficiency in analyzing the BLAKE family. Recently, Bai et al. have given the first valid 7-round and 8-round boomerangs for BLAKE-256 [12] .
As to BLAKE2, Guo et al. [13] have given a thorough security analysis of it. In their paper, they applied almost all the existing attacks on BLAKE to BLAKE2. According to their results, the tweaks introduced by BLAKE2, if analyzed separately, reduce the security of the version in some theoretical attacks. Some cryptanalysis methods manage to reach more rounds for BLAKE2 than BLAKE. BLAKE seems to have better resistance than BLAKE2 against various cryptanalysis methods. However, [13] did not evaluate the security margin of the two hash function families under the boomerang method and this is what we are going to do in this paper.
The original boomerang attack was introduced by Wagner in 1999 [14] as a tool for the cryptanalysis of block ciphers. It is an adaptive chosen plaintext and ciphertext attack utilizing differential cryptanalysis.
In the second part of this section, we review the procedure of the boomerang attack on hash functions and give some definitions that we use in the description of our attacks.
The Round Functions of BLAKE and BLAKE2
BLAKE and BLAKE2 share many similarities. As the successor of BLAKE, BLAKE2 has a 32-bit version (BLAKE2s) and a 64-bit version (BLAKE2b), corresponding to BLAKE-256 and BLAKE-512 of BLAKE respectively. Both BLAKE and BLAKE2 process 16-word message blocks. However, differences can be witnessed at every level including internal permutation, compression function, and hash function construction. Some notations have to be introduced first:
← variable assignment; + modular 2 32 or 2 64 addition (according to the word length); − modular 2 32 or 2 64 subtraction (according to the word length); ⊕ bitwise exclusive or; ≪ n cyclic shift n bits towards the most significant bit; ≫ n cyclic shift n bits towards the least significant bit; ∧ bitwise AND operation for words.
The Round functions of both BLAKE and BLAKE2 process a state of 16 64-bit or 32-bit words represented by a 4 × 4 matrix as follows:
In the remainder of this paper, we denote the 16-word intermediate state by the capital letters such as V, T V and M for message block. Single 64-bit or 32-bit words are denoted by small letters such as v, tv and m for message words. We also refer to the i-th bit of a word v (i = 0, · · · 31 or 63 from the least significant to the most significant) as v [i] .
Once the state V is initialized, V is processed by several rounds (10, 12, 14, 16 for BLAKE2s, BLAKE2b, BLAKE-256, BLAKE512 respectively) of G functions, which means computing
where G i (a, b, c, d), i = 0, · · · , 7 differ among BLAKE2s, BLAKE2b, BLAKE-256, BLAKE512 and are all listed in Table 2 . The σ r in Step 1 and 5 of the G i function in Table 2 belongs to the set of permutations as defined in Table 3 . At round r > 9, the permutation used is σ r mod 10 (for example, if r = 11, the permutation σ 11 mod 10 = σ 1 is used). Step BLAKE-256 BLAKE2s BLAKE-512
Since we need detailed analysis of the intermediate states, we further breakdown the round functions. We denote the state after r rounds of iterations by V r (r = 0, 1, · · · ). Then, T V r is acquired after the first 4 steps of G 0,··· ,3 and V r+0.5 is computed after G 0,··· ,3 are completed. Similarly, we can compute T V r+0.5 from V r+0.5 by applying steps 1,2,3,4 of G 4,··· ,7 and further compute V r+1 by finishing G 4,··· ,7 . This representation is illustrated as (1) and (2). 
In this way, we can refer to any intermediate state word of any round easily. Table 3 . The definition of σr where r = 0, · · · , 9. σ0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 σ1 14 10 4 8 9 15 13 6 1 12 0 2 11 7 5 3 σ2 11 8 12 0 5 2 15 13 10 14 3 6 7 1 9 4 σ3 7 9 3 1 13 12 11 14 2 6 5 10 4 0 15 8 σ4 9 0 5 7 2 4 10 15 14 1 11 12 6 8 3 13 σ5 2 12 6 10 0 11 8 3 4 13 7 5 15 14 1 9 σ6 12 5 1 15 14 13 4 10 0 7 6 3 9 2 8 11 σ7 13 11 7 14 12 1 3 9 5 0 15 4 8 6 2 10 σ8 6 15 14 9 11 3 0 8 12 2 13 7 1 4 10 5 σ9 10 2 8 4 7 6 1 5 15 11 9 14 3 12 13 0
The Boomerang Attack
About the boomerang attack on hash functions, we mainly review the known-related-key boomerang method given in [19] . We consider the compression function, denoted by CF , as CF (M, K) = E(M, K) + M and that it can be decomposed into two sub-functions as CF = CF 1 • CF 0 . In this way, we can start from the middle steps since M and the key K can be chosen randomly [19, 23] . Then we have a backward (top) differential characteristic (β, β k ) → α with probability p for CF −1 0 , and a forward (bottom) differential characteristic (γ, γ k ) → δ with probability q for CF 1 . Finally, we can launch the known-related-key boomerang attack with these two differential characteristics as follows:
It can be deduced that P 1 ⊕ P 3 = P 2 ⊕ P 4 = α and C 1 ⊕ C 2 = C 3 ⊕ C 4 = δ hold with probability at least p 2 in the backward direction and q 2 in the forward direction. Therefore, the attack succeeds with probability p 2 q 2 when assuming that the differential characteristics are independent. According H. Yu et al. in [24] , for a n-bit random permutation, there are three types of boomerang distinguishers:
-Type I: A quartet satifies P 1 ⊕ P 3 = P 2 ⊕ P 4 = α and C 1 ⊕ C 2 = C 3 ⊕ C 4 = δ for fixed differences α and δ. In this case, the generic complexity is 2 n . -Type II: Only C 1 ⊕ C 2 = C 3 ⊕ C 4 is satisfied (This property is also called zero-sum or second-order differential collision). In this case, the complexity for obtaining such a quartet is 2 n/3 [27]. -Type III: A quartet satisfied P 1 ⊕ P 3 = P 2 ⊕ P 4 and C 1 ⊕ C 2 = C 3 ⊕ C 4 . In this case, the best known still takes time 2 n/2 .
We only study the Type I boomerang distinguisher in this paper. Besides, the complexity 2 37 of the 7-round boomerang in [12] is actually the complexity for a Type III boomerang attack. The Type I complexity for the 7-round attack should be 2 2×(1+4+16+1) = 2 44 according to their methods.
The Boomerang Attacks on BLAKE and BLAKE2
In this section, we describe our boomerang attacks on BLAKE and BLAKE2. We only illustrate our strategies by comparing BLAKE-512 and BLAKE2b while those of BLAKE-256 and BLAKE2s can be deduced accordingly. Details are presented in Appendix A.
Construction of Differential Characteristics
The very first step for the boomerang attack is constructing two differential characteristics with high probability. Since BLAKE and BLAKE2 are ARX hash functions (only use three simple operations namely Modular Add "+", Rotation "≫" and XOR"⊕"), we can use the XOR difference and deduce the difference linearly by considering the only nonlinear operation "+" as similar linear operation "⊕". The XOR difference in this paper is represented in two forms as follow: in hex form, we denoted by ∆v = φ in numeric form.
The numeric form is mainly used to describe the differential characteristics since it has better outlook and can save some space. But in practice, we use the hex form to linearly deduce differential characteristics. For example, in the G function of BLAKE-512, we have
where c j is constant. Suppose we have acquired the differences ∆a, ∆b and ∆m i , we can dedcue ∆ta as
Once we have determined the difference of the message block ∆M and that of a intermediate state ∆V r (r = 0, 0.5, 1, · · · ), we can linearly extend the difference backward and forward. We construct the two differential characteristics for the boomerang attack, where the top differential characteristic is from round 2.5 to 6.5 and bottom differential difference is from 6.5 to 11. We denote the difference of the top by ∆ t V r (r ∈ [2.5, 6.5]) and that of the bottom by ∆ b V r (r ∈ [6.5, 11]). Similarly, the difference for the message block is denoted as ∆ t M in the top characteristic and ∆ b M in the bottom characteristic. The main procedures for our characteristic construction can be summarized as follows:
Import Difference: We first import simple difference to message block
, we extend the difference backward to round 6.5 (2.5) and forward to round 11 (6.5) to acquire the whole bottom (top) differential characteristic.
Construct the Bottom Differential Characteristic: In order to lower the complexity, we only import 1-bit differences to both
The selection of active bits is based on Observation 1 in [10] . We found that m 11 of the 16 message words, namely m 0 , · · · , m 15 , appears at Step 1 in G 2 at round 8 and also appears at Step 5 in G 4 at round 9. So, the first step of our construction is importing 1-bit difference to m 11 and v
In this way, according to Observation 1 in [10] , we can pass round 8 and 9 with probability 2
are settled, we can linearly extend the difference backward to ∆ b V 6.5 and forward to ∆ b V 11 . This method can be applied to both BLAKE-512 and BLAKE2b. We present the bottom characteristics of BLAKE-512 and BLAKE2b as Table 4 and 5 in Appendix A respectively.
For BLAKE-256 and BLAKE2s, we can also import difference to
and linearly deduce the whole bottom differential characteristics. The differential characteristic for BLAKE-256 mounts to round 10.5 and BLAKE2s reaches round 10 since it only has 10 rounds in total according to [6] . Refer to Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix A for detailed descriptions.
Construct the Top Differential Characteristic:
The top differential characteristic starts from ∆ t V
2.5
and ends at ∆ t V 6.5 . The strategy of constructing the top differential characteristic is similar to that of its bottom counterpart. We found that m 5 appears at Step 1 in G 1 at round 4 and also appears at Step 5 in G 5 at round 5, so we decide to import the 1-bit difference at m 5 and v 4 1 . We assign that
and that
. Then, we can linearly extend the difference backward and forward. The position of the active bit y in (5) requires careful selection. In order to avoid incompatible problems and enhance the efficiency of the attack, y must meet the following conditions:
1. When linearly extend the difference from ∆ t V 4 (y) to ∆ t V 6.5 (y), make sure that
This restriction avoid the contradictions in the intersection part of the two differential characteristics. 2. (Only for BLAKE-512) Make sure that the constants c 10 and c 7 satisfies:
According to the linear extension, we have
, so (7) must be satisfied.
(Only for BLAKE2b) When linearly extend to
should be set to
instead of 0x0. Because BLAKE2b omit the use of constant, the difference can not be eliminated at v 3.5
1 .
The available ys satisfying conditions 1 and 2 compose a set X 512 , and those satisfying conditions 1 and 3 compose a set X 2b . According to our analysis, X 512 has 13 elements and X 2b has 40 elements. We present X 512 and X 2b along with the corresponding top differential characteristics in Table 8 and Table 9 in Appendix A.
Using the same method, we can also acquire the available ys for BLAKE-256 (X 256 ) and BLAKE2s (X 2s ). We illustrate X 256 and X 2s along with their characteristics in Table 10 and Table 11 in Appendix A.
Finding the Boomerang Quartet Using Message Modification Technique
The goal of our boomerang attack is to find a quartet, denoted by
and, after 8.5 rounds, the corresponding quartet
We start by searching for appropriate a V 6.5 and a M . Once a V 6.5 is determined, b V 6.5 , c V 6.5 and d V 6.5 can be settled directly since
Once a M is determined, b M , c M and d M can also be determined according to (9) and (10 
, which is 167 in total. In the top characteristics, the situation is as follows: 1 unfixed condition in
, which is 65 in total. So, the complexity of the boomerang attack on BLAKE-512 is 2 (167+65)×2 = 2 464 . BLAKE2b: In the bottom characteristic, there are 4 unfixed conditions in
, which is 153 in total. The top differential characteristic is slightly different from BLAKE-512 after finishing the procedure
. So the number of unfixed conditions in the top characteristic enhances to 1 + 3 + 13 + 67 = 84. The complexity of the boomerang attack on BLAKE2b is 2 (153+84)×2 = 2 474 . BLAKE-256: Similar to BLAKE-512, the bottom characteristic of BLAKE-256, terminated at round 10.5, has 4 + 1 + 24 = 29 unfixed conditions (∆ b V 6.5 → ∆ t V 10.5 ). For the top characteristic of BLAKE-256, if we choose the active bit position y = 20 ∈ X 256 , which is also the case of [12] , there should be 71 unfixed conditions and the complexity of this 8-round boomerang attack is 2 (29+71)×2 = 2 200 . However, if we choose y = 28 ∈ X 256 , 1 condition in ∆ t V 3 → ∆ t V 2.5 can be eliminated and the complexity of the attack can lower to 2 (29+70)×2 = 2 198 . BLAKE2s: Similar to BLAKE2b, the bottom characteristic for BLAKE2s, terminated at round 10, has 4 + 1 = 5 unfixed conditions. The top characteristic has 88 unfixed conditions. So the complexity of this 7.5-round boomerang attack for BLAKE2s is 2 (5+88)×2 = 2 186 . Like BLAKE-256, if we choose y = 28 ∈ X 2s , we can eliminate 1 condition in ∆ t V 3 → ∆ t V 2.5 and lower the complexity by 2 2 to 2 184 .
Practical Verifications. For each member of BLAKE and BLAKE2, we present a 6.5 round ( from round 3.5 to round 10) Type I boomerang quartet based on our characteristics and present it in Appendix B. In order to show the structural difference between BLAKE and BLAKE2, we use the examples with the same message difference, which means: for BLAKE-256 and BLAKE2s, ∆ t m 5 = (28) (y = 28 ∈ X 256 X 2s ) and ∆ b m 11 = (31) ; for BLAKE-512 and BLAKE2b, ∆ t m 5 = (9) (y = 9 ∈ X 512 X 2b ) and ∆ b m 11 = (63).
Conclusion
In this paper, we compare the security margin of BLAKE and BLAKE2 under the boomerang attack model. We deduce valid differential characteristics and present boomerang attacks on keyed permutations of BLAKE-512, BLAKE2b, BLAKE-256 and BLAKE2s. According to our analysis, the boomerang method can mount to similar rounds for BLAKE and BLAKE2. For the same number of rounds, the complexities for attacking BLAKE2 are slightly higher than those for BLAKE, which indicates that some tweaks introduced by BLAKE2, aiming at enhancing efficiency and flexibility, have accidentally reinforced the resistance against the boomerang attack. However, since BLAKE has more rounds than BLAKE2, the security margin of BLAKE is still higher than that of BLAKE2. This result is in accordance with the assumptions of the designers. = (10) for BLAKE-2b) and φ for BLAKE-256 (BLAKE-512). We specifically emphasize this part with bold dark format. Table 12 . Example for 6.5-round BLAKE-256 with y = 28 ∈ X256 X2s.
0x932a5d7f 0xa2625330 0x46a9466f 0xae3052a3 0xbf9a6338 0xd4167790 0x7bf0ef5e 0x4ef572ba 0x308dc96d 0x23b415c3 0x6fb64798 0xa75b42e8 0x3cb6d30e 0xb56003b4 0x7a4db777 0x715b79a
b M 0x932a5d7f 0xa2625330 0x46a9466f 0xae3052a3 0xbf9a6338 0xd4167790 0x7bf0ef5e 0x4ef572ba 0x308dc96d 0x23b415c3 0x6fb64798 0x275b42e8 0x3cb6d30e 0xb56003b4 0x7a4db777 0x715b79a cM 0x932a5d7f 0xa2625330 0x46a9466f 0xae3052a3 0xbf9a6338 0xc4167790 0x7bf0ef5e 0x4ef572ba 0x308dc96d 0x23b415c3 0x6fb64798 0xa75b42e8 0x3cb6d30e 0xb56003b4 0x7a4db777 0x715b79a
d M 0x932a5d7f 0xa2625330 0x46a9466f 0xae3052a3 0xbf9a6338 0xc4167790 0x7bf0ef5e 0x4ef572ba 0x308dc96d 0x23b415c3 0x6fb64798 0x275b42e8 0x3cb6d30e 0xb56003b4 0x7a4db777 0x715b79a
0x7ce3001a 0x5f257eb 0x7cb1b540 0xf5f76e6 0x62eba0a0 0x8723a3b3 0x3a617d3b 0x616c91a2 0xf2e28cd6 0x2dd8b157 0x888f9a21 0x6074df04 0x370f729f 0xeecddee4 0x7f42197f 0x36ace0f3
0xce7042ae 0xc394a0c1 0xbdedbda1 0xbf9d773f 0x7fdd9e46 0xdefe6c9e 0xf9985a99 0x2e67c857 0x8903f293 0xfc2ed055 0xbcb66021 0x5ac97fd7 0xa42a029b 0x60de7589 0x637162de 0xfd1bd434 cV 3.5 0x7ce3001a 0x5f257eb 0x7cb1b540 0xf5f76e6 0x62eba0a0 0x8723a3b3 0x3a617d3b 0x616c91a2 0xf2e28cd6 0x2dd8b157 0x888f9a21 0x7074df04 0x270f629f 0xeecddee4 0x7f42197f 0x36ace0f3
0xce7042ae 0xc394a0c1 0xbdedbda1 0xbf9d773f 0x7fdd9e46 0xdefe6c9e 0xf9985a99 0x2e67c857 0x8903f293 0xfc2ed055 0xbcb66021 0x4ac97fd7 0xb42a129b 0x60de7589 0x637162de 0xfd1bd434 0x9920f4d5 0x7d8a6621 0xc7139615 0x205a3fce 0x4ded77e1 0x1ed1c43f 0x6e8efedc 0xf6f4fe72 0x6e17623b 0x4cd8bea2 0xfe2149af 0xd2f8e09c 0x53b6139c 0x3972162e 0xd4f82167 0x4d1b2a46 b V 10 0x1920f4d5 0x7d8a6621 0xc7139615 0x205a3fce 0x4ded77e1 0x1ed0c43f 0x6e8efedc 0xf6f4fe72 0x6e17623b 0x4cd8bea2 0xfea149af 0xd2f8e09c 0x53b6139c 0x3972162e 0xd4f82167 0x4d9b2a46 cV 10 0x5a870d65 0x8d12db5 0x537127c9 0xabdb13a9 0xcaf27105 0x17ef5f49 0x66721638 0x8f333fbf 0xccdc1196 0x3d9aaba6 0x84ee030c 0xda86539 0x976348e3 0xfde7c240 0x1df99dc8 0x568a818c
0xda870d65 0x8d12db5 0x537127c9 0xabdb13a9 0xcaf27105 0x17ee5f49 0x66721638 0x8f333fbf 0xccdc1196 0x3d9aaba6 0x846e030c 0xda86539 0x976348e3 0xfde7c240 0x1df99dc8 0x560a818c Table 13 . Example for 6.5-round BLAKE2s with y = 28 ∈ X256 X2s.
aM 0xce9f1cc6 0x7f3a9b64 0x9e9ddc55 0x4553fa8c 0xe2f4ad99 0x33a0533a 0x8b1d785c 0xc7f56492 0xe5b2b205 0xd44f69a1 0x2d83e500 0x18b03f68 0x13d0c628 0x15fce9f2 0x9108f878 0xc477ca04
b M 0xce9f1cc6 0x7f3a9b64 0x9e9ddc55 0x4553fa8c 0xe2f4ad99 0x33a0533a 0x8b1d785c 0xc7f56492 0xe5b2b205 0xd44f69a1 0x2d83e500 0x98b03f68 0x13d0c628 0x15fce9f2 0x9108f878 0xc477ca04 cM 0xce9f1cc6 0x7f3a9b64 0x9e9ddc55 0x4553fa8c 0xe2f4ad99 0x23a0533a 0x8b1d785c 0xc7f56492 0xe5b2b205 0xd44f69a1 0x2d83e500 0x18b03f68 0x13d0c628 0x15fce9f2 0x9108f878 0xc477ca04
d M 0xce9f1cc6 0x7f3a9b64 0x9e9ddc55 0x4553fa8c 0xe2f4ad99 0x23a0533a 0x8b1d785c 0xc7f56492 0xe5b2b205 0xd44f69a1 0x2d83e500 0x98b03f68 0x13d0c628 0x15fce9f2 0x9108f878 0xc477ca04
0x71177c4a 0x456e63aa 0x63bc0484 0xe348f6a9 0xfa5c62fe 0x1229c0a3 0x12ea25d0 0xd7a6a55f 0x3ca79134 0x6ccc6e48 0x2bd29e5 0xc386b1 0x86f12557 0x414c79f1 0x3fb6c33 0x4baef1a0
0xaae6286d 0x1af8dcfe 0x70a74337 0xa293966a 0xe35d9b23 0xe74273b3 0xfb967985 0xc16500a7 0x57a589c8 0x5edbf5ae 0x66de7b25 0x15c8f5ff 0xd730836 0x357d6100 0x3ae77969 0x54a834da cV 3.5 0x71177c4a 0x656e63aa 0x63bc0484 0xe348f6a9 0xfa5c62fe 0x1229c0a3 0x12ea25d0 0xd7a6a55f 0x3ca79134 0x6ccc6e48 0x2bd29e5 0x10c386b1 0x96f13557 0x414c79f1 0x3fb6c33 0x4baef1a0
0xaae6286d 0x3af8dcfe 0x70a74337 0xa293966a 0xe35d9b23 0xe74273b3 0xfb967985 0xc16500a7 0x57a589c8 0x5edbf5ae 0x66de7b25 0x5c8f5ff 0x1d731836 0x357d6100 0x3ae77969 0x54a834da 0x945cf52e 0x422107ab 0x3a682330 0x2f8bd4f1 0xeead389 0x21e907ec 0x17138a07 0xae021462 0x229a3e13 0x3c623c2c 0x64327d4a 0xf1d0e09a 0x5df5abad 0x1be8464a 0x7890983a 0x85288868 b V 10 0x145cf52e 0x422107ab 0x3a682330 0x2f8bd4f1 0xeead389 0x21e807ec 0x17138a07 0xae021462 0x229a3e13 0x3c623c2c 0x64b27d4a 0xf1d0e09a 0x5df5abad 0x1be8464a 0x7890983a 0x85a88868 cV 10 0xc136da56 0xe91ba476 0xfa9ad265 0x6b4d2f9e 0x68ef06c8 0x9ab4757a 0xe63456e0 0x8818e9d4 0x5da1784c 0x57ecd14b 0xcb0788b8 0xf3148edf 0xa19d7f24 0xf17b5303 0x9ec70b70 0x2f763872
0x4136da56 0xe91ba476 0xfa9ad265 0x6b4d2f9e 0x68ef06c8 0x9ab5757a 0xe63456e0 0x8818e9d4 0x5da1784c 0x57ecd14b 0xcb8788b8 0xf3148edf 0xa19d7f24 0xf17b5303 0x9ec70b70 0x2ff63872 Table 14 . Example for 6.5-round BLAKE-512 with y = 9 ∈ X512 X 2b .
aM 0x9c1860c444a6a9f4 0xc95a712fd5a29b72 0x6e5c6811448b300f 0x5c0af45531e396d3 0x679dee5280c15ad0 0x329f5347ccb9bf64 0x297828d3ec89e9d0 0xa55ffc029ea78609 0xef01f63ec485f87d 0x86560936e36d9dff 0xfd9674bb724d62e0 0x9c03f6f64a96659f 0xe3666bd816053d27 0xe4669665a4a0a440 0x1cbf0c93a121eb09 0x65a6a90ac809c019 b M 0x9c1860c444a6a9f4 0xc95a712fd5a29b72 0x6e5c6811448b300f 0x5c0af45531e396d3 0x679dee5280c15ad0 0x329f5347ccb9bf64 0x297828d3ec89e9d0 0xa55ffc029ea78609 0xef01f63ec485f87d 0x86560936e36d9dff 0xfd9674bb724d62e0 0x1c03f6f64a96659f 0xe3666bd816053d27 0xe4669665a4a0a440 0x1cbf0c93a121eb09 0x65a6a90ac809c019 cM 0x9c1860c444a6a9f4 0xc95a712fd5a29b72 0x6e5c6811448b300f 0x5c0af45531e396d3 0x679dee5280c15ad0 0x329f5347ccb9bd64 0x297828d3ec89e9d0 0xa55ffc029ea78609 0xef01f63ec485f87d 0x86560936e36d9dff 0xfd9674bb724d62e0 0x9c03f6f64a96659f 0xe3666bd816053d27 0xe4669665a4a0a440 0x1cbf0c93a121eb09 0x65a6a90ac809c019 d M 0x9c1860c444a6a9f4 0xc95a712fd5a29b72 0x6e5c6811448b300f 0x5c0af45531e396d3 0x679dee5280c15ad0 0x329f5347ccb9bd64 0x297828d3ec89e9d0 0xa55ffc029ea78609 0xef01f63ec485f87d 0x86560936e36d9dff 0xfd9674bb724d62e0 0x1c03f6f64a96659f 0xe3666bd816053d27 0xe4669665a4a0a440 0x1cbf0c93a121eb09 0x65a6a90ac809c019
0xc87af7255a6ec986 0xc59be5b07a4418d7 0x5295eb179fee042c 0x4f87d569d171c685 0xc1c24f85f094b263 0xbc711b20878eb4ea 0x1cda016fcf08ee93 0x878f439bd1398fec 0x982d7a384b8549bb 0x29cd6958f1a234c3 0xb81579ed9e3eff45 0xbfba600ee495e360 0x4d5e10f24eba6506 0x4f8a20a0c7164ef8 0x4156d917e0e33e7b 0x8f204cb6dc806747
0x57926274c228f656 0x5ac46fa843cda867 0x936f1f621381dad4 0xbd0f73ec836d47bc 0xbac8918094537e74 0x1edec058ea817875 0xc5bf41aeadf39382 0x4149082191041e60 0x9fd575b7fe10ace3 0x8fed3642acc17d51 0x1ded33ae6ee468ba 0x5365299759c0a42 0x89f06ef09e1612ee 0xe597ede91683a2d8 0x389825cb39587e4f 0xff48c413164455c3 cV 3.5 0xc87af7255a6ec986 0xc59be5b07a4418d7 0x5295eb179fee042c 0x4f87d569d171c685 0xc1c24f85f094b263 0xbc711b20878eb4ea 0x1cda016fcf08ee93 0x878f439bd1398fec 0x982d7a384b8549bb 0x29cd6958f1a234c3 0xb81579ed9e3eff45 0xbfba600ee495e160 0x4d5e12f24eba6706 0x4f8a20a0c7164ef8 0x4156d917e0e33e7b 0x8f204cb6dc806747
0x57926274c228f656 0x5ac46fa843cda867 0x936f1f621381dad4 0xbd0f73ec836d47bc 0xbac8918094537e74 0x1edec058ea817875 0xc5bf41aeadf39382 0x4149082191041e60 0x9fd575b7fe10ace3 0x8fed3642acc17d51 0x1ded33ae6ee468ba 0x5365299759c0842 0x89f06cf09e1610ee 0xe597ede91683a2d8 0x389825cb39587e4f 0xff48c413164455c3 0x1b404ab31fbe9343 0xc01ae4355f49855f 0xf52deb99e6d25dee 0xba1e74d813d9e09c 0x1d4142ceee078181 0x8c7261a65899559 0x780312586191c134 0x86c7c29f8161a9ac 0x77f4ec97a373e3dd 0x7068ac849086f0c3 0xfc3c0163cdc3f7b9 0x52d68b2940599cfa 0x59ad1c82831be8f7 0x74d99e11568eb396 0x3552275c6ddcf7a3 0x8dfe0979b5e83dbd b V 10 0x9b404ab31fbe9343 0xc01ae4355f49855f 0xf52deb99e6d25dee 0xba1e74d813d9e09c 0x1d4142ceee078181 0x8c7260a65899559 0x780312586191c134 0x86c7c29f8161a9ac 0x77f4ec97a373e3dd 0x7068ac849086f0c3 0xfc3c8163cdc3f7b9 0x52d68b2940599cfa 0x59ad1c82831be8f7 0x74d99e11568eb396 0x3552275c6ddcf7a3 0x8dfe8979b5e83dbd cV 10 0xcc0a78ca6c133737 0xa6a12a75a2ab0a78 0xaaff3e032bf0964f 0x6a833f52c06326f8 0x1571fbe8468d6869 0x224b394014f172d8 0x72a0866c8eb1dfcc 0x4af2b98060eea9bb 0xe7f5b1b201006785 0xa57c9190f805d201 0xdea0ecffe0219e24 0xbbec25c771762bfb 0xd312a8ab8e4df740 0xd9a366032739ede2 0xb8d5bfa962e8d684 0xb122b4542c543d9d
0x4c0a78ca6c133737 0xa6a12a75a2ab0a78 0xaaff3e032bf0964f 0x6a833f52c06326f8 0x1571fbe8468d6869 0x224b395014f172d8 0x72a0866c8eb1dfcc 0x4af2b98060eea9bb 0xe7f5b1b201006785 0xa57c9190f805d201 0xdea06cffe0219e24 0xbbec25c771762bfb 0xd312a8ab8e4df740 0xd9a366032739ede2 0xb8d5bfa962e8d684 0xb12234542c543d9d Table 15 . Example for 6.5-round BLAKE2b with y = 9 ∈ X512 X 2b .
aM 0x3cec6965bf357a5 0x3efa6687e114e70d 0x6fe9d72277e832e4 0x60574e830fad0b27 0x1bad3b4b1257079e 0x43b8e8ebf1bc4557 0xc553a639b52984b0 0x95bd9c03c94695e5 0xc4e9f58d840c74c9 0x2186128d765d51b0 0x10bc4fee175e6c82 0x18ddcb4d4ac938ee 0x5cf2d8b6cf1ea3ce 0x3ec5aa659dacedf5 0xadf91c482e6b4506 0xa34876d149007c7b
b M 0x3cec6965bf357a5 0x3efa6687e114e70d 0x6fe9d72277e832e4 0x60574e830fad0b27 0x1bad3b4b1257079e 0x43b8e8ebf1bc4557 0xc553a639b52984b0 0x95bd9c03c94695e5 0xc4e9f58d840c74c9 0x2186128d765d51b0 0x10bc4fee175e6c82 0x98ddcb4d4ac938ee 0x5cf2d8b6cf1ea3ce 0x3ec5aa659dacedf5 0xadf91c482e6b4506 0xa34876d149007c7b cM 0x3cec6965bf357a5 0x3efa6687e114e70d 0x6fe9d72277e832e4 0x60574e830fad0b27 0x1bad3b4b1257079e 0x43b8e8ebf1bc4757 0xc553a639b52984b0 0x95bd9c03c94695e5 0xc4e9f58d840c74c9 0x2186128d765d51b0 0x10bc4fee175e6c82 0x18ddcb4d4ac938ee 0x5cf2d8b6cf1ea3ce 0x3ec5aa659dacedf5 0xadf91c482e6b4506 0xa34876d149007c7b
d M 0x3cec6965bf357a5 0x3efa6687e114e70d 0x6fe9d72277e832e4 0x60574e830fad0b27 0x1bad3b4b1257079e 0x43b8e8ebf1bc4757 0xc553a639b52984b0 0x95bd9c03c94695e5 0xc4e9f58d840c74c9 0x2186128d765d51b0 0x10bc4fee175e6c82 0x98ddcb4d4ac938ee 0x5cf2d8b6cf1ea3ce 0x3ec5aa659dacedf5 0xadf91c482e6b4506 0xa34876d149007c7b ∆ t 0xa8f431bca7166664 0x2bce47208c2b479d 0x2554f082eb89d530 0x12b06bc7f71ebe12 0x5d733d5fa41457fc 0xae2b3d68d8adfe2f 0xe03c7fa88285b93d 0xe134f22af656a9d9 0x8bcd47a74a5e35a2 0x21098bd0acfbc078 0x9d0ddd6c2403d2ab 0xf0dbb0c6a9a392c5 0xd72aa227f3c2a651 0x406e07f8eec1929f 0x863da54a0653fe1f 0xefb750af7de2c392
0x63b1930b9a252aff 0xd754470ae2a5de96 0x1b39d8f987ec3762 0x201afad51a642cb1 0x1d5c8e5fb50c1c68 0x709103f9ba538f43 0xb847dad7a1bf8a56 0xa59f9b63902edb4 0x40d96db5d9d3b546 0x332aed26d86aceaa 0x424eaab611c9c6f 0x802b683db9ac54b9 0x110cd82fdac384dd 0xa93fe8a10201b57b 0x49eed3d94b17685a 0xcdf2a00fd5300651 cV 3.5 0xa8f431bca7166664 0x2bce47208c2b439d 0x2554f082eb89d530 0x12b06bc7f71ebe12 0x5d733d5fa41457fc 0xae2b3d68d8adfe2f 0xe03c7fa88285b93d 0xe134f22af656a9d9 0x8bcd47a74a5e35a2 0x21098bd0acfbc078 0x9d0ddd6c2403d2ab 0xf0dbb0c6a9a390c5 0xd72aa027f3c2a451 0x406e07f8eec1929f 0x863da54a0653fe1f 0xefb750af7de2c392
0x63b1930b9a252aff 0xd754470ae2a5da96 0x1b39d8f987ec3762 0x201afad51a642cb1 0x1d5c8e5fb50c1c68 0x709103f9ba538f43 0xb847dad7a1bf8a56 0xa59f9b63902edb4 0x40d96db5d9d3b546 0x332aed26d86aceaa 0x424eaab611c9c6f 0x802b683db9ac56b9 0x110cda2fdac386dd 0xa93fe8a10201b57b 0x49eed3d94b17685a 0xcdf2a00fd5300651 0x96ace3d164600933 0x6785c14493444a3d 0xadc3b5f6dbc8c992 0xada06d115f42653a 0xcb06b797a6152dbe 0xf701f3e0f76be4cb 0xf4baf3238d75bdb6 0xb71965677688de57 0xaa494db2c0d12db8 0x10ab8d9652485fcf 0xb97f5a3ef869239f 0x560aff2ec6a0d95f 0x1597013f79b484d1 0x182beacffdc6ec05 0x6802644a544f6271 0x59ac761a17acecca b V 10 0x16ace3d164600933 0x6785c14493444a3d 0xadc3b5f6dbc8c992 0xada06d115f42653a 0xcb06b797a6152dbe 0xf700f3e0f76be4cb 0xf4baf3238d75bdb6 0xb71965677688de57 0xaa494db2c0d12db8 0x10ab8d9652485fcf 0xb97fda3ef869239f 0x560aff2ec6a0d95f 0x1597013f79b484d1 0x182beacffdc6ec05 0x6802644a544f6271 0x59acf61a17acecca cV 10 0xe8d4f6a3aa68e9d6 0x1ba5272a94ed608d 0x51b3a429d5ee6873 0x50af4c1bb7b31dd2 0x738835de6bff309d 0xc5fc88e668afef14 0x1671fea856c55b2d 0xd04b446c31b59a1b 0x8f120d94bae51fa1 0x5be58c40a2d2c0a9 0xe9c1de5ac5992a67 0xa307fd45e31b7817 0xbd4864acd0f2e4bc 0x4a8a43605d94a9b4 0x16e63ec7c12bc056 0x30e48769ae169de0
0x68d4f6a3aa68e9d6 0x1ba5272a94ed608d 0x51b3a429d5ee6873 0x50af4c1bb7b31dd2 0x738835de6bff309d 0xc5fd88e668afef14 0x1671fea856c55b2d 0xd04b446c31b59a1b 0x8f120d94bae51fa1 0x5be58c40a2d2c0a9 0xe9c15e5ac5992a67 0xa307fd45e31b7817 0xbd4864acd0f2e4bc 0x4a8a43605d94a9b4 0x16e63ec7c12bc056 0x30e40769ae169de0
